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Abstract
Among all media of communications, Internet is most vulnerable to attacks owing to its
public nature and virtually without centralized control. With the growing financial dealings
and dependence of businesses on Internet, these attacks have even more increased. Whereas
previously hackers would satisfy themselves by breaking into someoneâ s system, in
today's world hackers' work under an organized crime plan to obtain illicit financial gains.
Various attacks than include spamming, phishing, click fraud, distributed denial of services,
hosting illegal material, key logging, etc. are being carried out by hackers using botnets. In
this paper a detailed study of botnets vis-a-vis their creation, propagation, command and
control techniques, communication protocols and relay mechanism is presented. The aim of
this paper is to gain an insight of security threats that users of Internet are facing from
hackers by the use of malicious botnets.
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BOTS AND BOTNETS
The term bot, derived from “ro-bot” in its generic form is used to describe a script or set of
scripts or a program designed to perform predefined functions repeatedly and automatically after
being triggered intentionally or through a system infection. Although bots originated as a useful
feature for carrying out repetitive and time consuming operations but they are being exploited for
malicious intent. Bots that are used to carry out legitimate activities in an automated manner are
called benevolent bots and those that are meant for malicious intent are known as malicious bots.
Benevolent bots among various other activities are used by search engines to spider online
website content and by online games to provide virtual opponent (Cooke & et al – 2005).
The first bot program Eggdrop created by Jeff Fisher in 1993 originated as a useful
feature on Internet Relay Chat (IRC) (Green & et al – 2000) for text based conferencing on many
machines in a distributed fashion. In a typical IRC setup (Oikarinen & Reed – 1993), a user
running an IRC client program connects to an IRC server in an IRC network. The default TCP
service port for IRC is 6667 and generally IRC servers listen on port range of 6000-7000, though
servers could be configured to run on any TCP port. All servers are interconnected and pass
messages from one user to other. As IRC gained popularity among Internet users, attacks on IRC
started, initially due to curiosity or seeking fame and later for illicit financial gain, resulting in its
misuse. An IRC malicious bot program runs on an IRC host or client each time it boots in a
hidden manner and controlled by commands given by other IRC bot(s). It is typically an
executable file with a size of less than 15 KB in its compressed form. An IRC host computer
running an IRC bot malware program becomes a Zombie or a drone (Choo – 2007). The first
malicious IRC bot, Pretty Park Worm that appeared in 1999 contained a limited set of
functionality and features, such as the ability to connect to a remote IRC server, retrieve basic
system information e.g. operating system version, login names, email addresses, etc. (Puri –
2003). However, bots extend the basic functions of their predecessors and have become a very
powerful tool in building large computer armies which is the key difference between bots and
other programs like viruses and worms. This very large pool of such Zombie hosts running bot
programs form a large network called a botnet run under the command and control of a single or
a group of hackers known as botmaster. Any host on Internet that is compromised by the
botmaster becomes part of this botnet. A typical botnet comprises of thousands of Zombie hosts
and thus poses a tremendous threat to the Internet security and privacy (Schaffer – 2006). For
creating a bigger and safer botnet that could remain up and running for large duration without
detection, most vulnerable to bot infection are less monitored, high bandwidth home computers
or University Servers (Vogt, Aycock & Jacobson – 2007). According to (MessageLabs - 2009)
various notorious botnets that have been reported in the literature include Storm, Srizbi, Cutwail,
Gheg, Mega-D, ASPROX, Rustuch, Warezor, Doubot, Ozdok, Xarvester and Bagle. Their
estimated size of these botnets in terms of number of bot malware compromised computers
varies from a few bots to a million bots. The average spam emails send through these bots per
day ranges from a million messages to more than ten billion messages.
BOTNET CREATION AND PROPOGATION
The process of building a botnet requires minimum technical and programming skills.
Besides this, some IRC channels offer specialized training programs (Lanelli & Hackworth –
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2005) for creation, propagation and use of botnets. A brief two stage overview of building a
botnet is outlined in this section.
Bot Creation
This stage largely depends on skills and requirements of an attacker. The attacker may
choose to write its own code or simply extend or customize an existing bot. Readymade and
highly configurable bots with step by step instructions on how to compromise systems are sold
on Internet. The instructions include instructions to obtain packaging exploits, simple character
and graphical user interfaces, and various other tools for gaining backdoor entry into networks
(Barford & Yagneswaran – 2006). The bot code generally contains configurable components that
include IRC server and channel information, remote IRC TCP service port, the location and
name of the bot code file in the infected machine, and other components permitting the botmaster
to dynamically change the attack behavior and to hide itself, list of botmasters and their
credentials. The values pertaining to these components are supplied to the bots by the
botmaster(s) using various Command and Control techniques (Barford & Yagneswaran – 2006).
Bot Propagation
In this stage vulnerable systems and tools to exploit them are located which are then used
to gain backdoor access to these systems facilitating installation of bot malware by uploading or
commanding the victim machine to download a copy of the bot malware (Shannon & Moore –
2004). This infection stage involves use of various direct and indirect techniques to spread bot
malware. These include attack through software vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities caused by other
infections, social engineering through the use of email, instant messaging and malicious web
page content. The bot malware is also propagated through peer to peer networks, open file
sharing, and direct client to client file exchange. Bot malware uses FTP, TFTP, HTTP protocol
based services to infect computers and spread it until a desired strength of botnet is assembled
(Choo – 2007). Botnets are also created by other botnets called seed botnets.
BOTNET COMMAND AND CONTROL (C&C) TECHNIQUES
Once bot malware is recruited on the victim machines, the botmaster has to discover
these bot malware infected machines. Once discovered, the botmaster needs to control these
victim machines through some form of communication to carry out the desired operations. One
simple possible method of communication between bots and botmaster is through a direct control
message communication link. However, such a direct link can easily locate the botmaster and as
such this type of communication is not used. Instead several organized command languages and
control protocols called botnet Command and Control (C&C) techniques are used to operate
botnets remotely. Communication between bots and the C&C machine is the weakest link in a
botnet, without which the victim cloud does not behave as a coordinated network (Barford &
Yagneswaran – 2006). C&C system of botnets is unique and unlikely to change among bots and
their variants, however; attackers are continuing to adapt and look for new botnet communication
channels. In this section we discuss three different categories of command and control techniques
namely centralized, peer to peer and random.
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Centralized Command & Control (C&C) Technique
This C&C technique uses a central high bandwidth host called C&C server to forward
messages between various bots (Govil & Dayanand – 2007). The C&C server in a botnet is a
compromised computer that runs certain network services like IRC, HTTP, etc and which rallies
the commands issued by the botmaster to each host in the botnet that join the C&C server
channel. Botnets use various mechanisms to protect their communications which include the use
of passwords set by the botmasters. The centralized C&C is most predominant C&C technique
and many bots including AgoBot, RBot, SDBot, SpamThru and Zotob use this C&C technique.
There are several advantages of using centralized C&C techniques out of which easy availability
and greater productivity are most predominant. A great amount of resources are available online
to create a C&C based botnet that include IRC server and IRC bot scripts, simple CUI and GUI
customization interfaces, etc. Centralized C&C allows controlling of as many bots as possible
and thus maximizes the profit of the botmaster. Small message latency and lack of adequate
countermeasures in fighting against botnets especially on unprotected and unmonitored networks
have also motivated the botnet operators to use centralized C&C technique. The only drawback
of centralized C&C technique is that C&C server is the weakest point in the entire botnet link as
all communication passes through this single point. Once the central location is discovered, the
entire botnet can be easily neutralized.
P2P Command & Control (C&C) Technique
The peer to peer C&C technique uses P2P communication with no real central server to
forward messages between botnets which makes it more resilient to failures in the network
(Cooke & et al – 2005). Unlike centralized C&C technique, P2P C&C technique is much harder
to discover and destroy; even if one or more bots are neutralized, the botnet still continues to
operate. Further, an anonymous P2P technique may be used to make it even more difficult to
detect. However the botnet size supported by P2P systems is generally very low in comparison to
centralized systems, which makes profit oriented botmasters to avoid using P2P technique. Also
the propagation latency and guaranteed message delivery is lacking in P2P systems. Some
examples of botnets that use P2P C&C technique include Phatbot and Sinit.
Random Command & Control (C&C) Technique
The idea of random C&C technique has been presented by Evan Cooke (Cooke & et al –
2005), however no botnet has been reported to have used this C&C technique. In this C&C
technique no bot can know about the existence of more than one other bot thus making the
detection of the botnet very difficult. A botmaster or a bot can send an encrypted message
randomly which may be intercepted by other bot and a conversation could begin. In this
command and control technique message latency is very high, however; unlike other command
and control techniques it lags guaranteed message delivery.
BOTNETS COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS AND RALLY MECHANISMS
The command and control techniques described above use various communication
protocols (Rajab & et al – 2006) and rally mechanisms (Govil & Dayanand – 2007). Botnets
make use of some well defined network communication protocols that include more importantly
IRC protocol, HTTP protocol and other protocols like IM and P2P protocols. The
communication protocols used in botnets provide an understanding of the botnets origin and the
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possible software tools that may be used by the botnet. Besides this, knowledge of
communication protocol used by a botnet provides an understanding for decoding the
communication that takes place between bots and the botmasters.
In an IRC protocol based botnet, the C&C server is installed as an IRC service on a host
computer and botmaster creates a channel on the C&C server. The bots connect to this channel,
receive commands from the botmaster and execute these instructions to carry out various types
of malicious functions. The flexibility of IRC protocol to be used as a group communication or
private communication system makes it possible for botmaster to command all bots or
selectively select a group of bots in a botnet to carry out a malicious activity.
Although IRC protocol is the most predominant method used in botnets, yet the
monitoring of IRC traffic and the installation of firewalls to reduce the chances of falling victim
to a botmaster, some botnets have been using different communication protocols including
HTTP, IM and P2P protocols. IM and P2P protocols are used for creating botnet of relatively
small size but HTTP protocol is used to create a large sized botnet. Although HTTP traffic
generated by botnets is different from the normal HTTP traffic, yet it is difficult to detect it
because it hides itself within huge legitimate HTTP traffic.
Bots include either hard coded C&C server IP addresses or hard coded domain names to
connect to the C&C servers. Inclusion of hard coded C&C server IP addresses with bot code
makes it easy to detect, block the C&C server and neutralize the entire botnet. In order to evade
detection, this type of rally mechanism is not used in bots. Bots include hard coded domain
names assigned by dynamic DNS providers, so that even if the C&C server IP address is located
botmaster can update the dynamic DNS entry to map the server at some other address and
continue operating the botnet. Some botmasters operate their own unauthorized distributed DNS
servers that are used to resolve the IP addresses of the C&C servers.
SECURITY THREATS FROM BOTNET
With the growing sophistication of botnets and highly skilled and organized botmasters, a
powerful threat as that from viruses, Trojan horses, network intrusion, worms and other familiar
cyber threats (McCarty – 2003) persists to the Internet security and privacy. Botmasters are more
numerous, sophisticated, harder to identify, have better tools and very large size of bot armies
and thus can command the individual zombies to carry out various types of attacks that include
but is not limited to distributed denial of services (DDoS), spamming, phishing, identity theft,
click fraud, hosting of illegal material, disseminating malicious code, and a variety of other
possible attacks (McKewan – 2006). Several studies and reports that include (Kandula & et al –
2005), (McAfee – 2005), (AHTCC – 2006), (Dunn – 2005), (David – 2006), (FCAC – 2006) and
(Biever & Celeste - 2004) have reported the use of botnets in carrying out several types of
attacks on one or the other service available on the Internet.
Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS)
Denial of Services (DoS) attack is an attempt on a computer system or network to make
unavailable the computational resources to its intended user. A Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack is
a DoS attack which involves use of multiple compromised systems to cause a loss of service to
its intended users by depleting the bandwidth and other computational resources of the target
system or network. Bandwidth depletion and resource depletion are two main variants of DDoS
attacks. Flooding and reflection attacks are two primary types of bandwidth depletion attacks.
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Bandwidth depletion involves flooding a target machine with unwanted traffic as an attempt to
overwhelm the processing power of the target machine. Flooding attack involves sending
multiple packets to some target website simultaneously to congest traffic. The reflection attack
involves sending many packets to many computers with a spoofed source address. Resource
depletion also called protocol exploitation involves a target that specifically attempts to deplete
resources on the targeted computer or cause it to become unstable and crash. To launch a DDoS
attack using botnet has several advantages that include magnifying impact of the attack without
the requirement of any source IP address spoofing. A DDoS attack on the DNS servers of United
States Department of Defense has been reportedly carried out in Feb, 2006.
Spamming
Loosely defining spam is any message or posting, regardless of its content, that is sent to
multiple recipients who have not specifically requested the message (Opt-In). Spam can also be
multiple postings of the same message to newsgroups or list servers that are not related to the
topic of discussion. A person engaged in spamming is called spammer. Spam in blogs called
blog spam or comment spam is a form of search engine spamming done manually or
automatically by posting random comments, promoting commercial services, to blogs, wikis,
guestbooks, or other publicly-accessible online discussion boards. Any web application that
accepts and displays hyperlinks submitted by visitors may be a target of Link Spam. This is the
placing or solicitation of links randomly on other sites, placing a desired keyword into the
hyperlinked text of the backlink. Blogs, guest books, forums and any site that accepts visitors'
comments are particular targets and are often victims of drive-by spamming, where automated
software creates nonsense posts with links that are usually irrelevant and unwanted. Link spam
dishonestly and deliberately manipulates link-based ranking algorithms of search engines like
Google's PageRank to increase the rank of a web site or page so that it is placed as close to the
top of search results as possible. Spam generally refers to email, rather than other forms of
electronic communication. The term spim, for example, is used for unsolicited advertising via
Instant Messaging. Spit refers to unsolicited advertising via Voice Over Internet Protocol
(VOIP). Unsolicited advertising on wireless devices such as cell phones is called wireless spam.
Spammers use various techniques and tools that include spoofing, spam botnets (Husna
& et al – 2008), open proxies, open mail relays, untraceable Internet connections, and bulk email
tools for sending unsolicited bulk email. Spammers operate as a creative group who work
through secret networks to meet and share email addresses. The two most effective approaches to
gather or harvest emails are to monitor Internet use and to ask for email addresses. Some of the
most popular methods of email harvesting are guessing, purchased lists, legitimate email lists,
web pages, white/yellow page sites, web & paper forms, usenet posts, web browser, hacking,
user profiles, irc and chat rooms. The significant increase in the spam volume mostly due to
botnets has been the key development in the year 2008 (MessageLabs - 2009).
Phishing and Identity Theft
Phishing is used to describe spoof emails and other technical ploys to trick receipts into
giving up their personal or their company’s confidential information such as social security
number, financial account credentials and other identity and security information. Some phishing
emails look extremely professional and realistic, while others are crude and badly constructed
but have a common goal to steal information through deception. This form of identity theft
(McCarty – 2003b) employs both social engineering and technical subterfuge to steal account
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access information, identity or other proprietary information that can be sold on to third party via
specialized chat rooms established specifically for this purpose. Selling the information onwards
reduces the risk of being apprehended by minimizing the direct link between the hacker and
those using the information to gain unauthorized access to accounts and profiting from them.
Social engineering schemes use spoofed emails to lead customers to counterfeit websites
designed to trick recipients into divulging financial data. Technical subterfuge schemes plant
crime ware onto computers to steal credentials directly using keylogging systems. Pharming
crimeware misdirects users to fraudulent sites or proxy servers, typically through Domain Name
System (DNS) hijacking or poisoning. The term “phishing” evolved from the word “fishing”
and follows a very similar approach. Fraudsters and scammers, the “fishermen”, send out large
quantities of deceptive emails, the “bait”, to mostly random address across the Internet.
Phishing is a serious and increasingly prolific form of spam, and is one of the main
tactics employed in business and consumer identity theft. Phishing actually comprises of two
online identity thefts which are the identity of the target company and its unsuspecting
customers. Target Company is commonly a bank, online payment service or other reputable
business organization. A typical phishing attack is made up of two components: an authentic
looking email and a fraudulent Web page. This form of spam of email frequently has a
professional look that includes company logos, colors, graphics, font styles, and other elements
to successfully spoof the sender. The content of the phishing email is usually designed to
confuse, upset, or excite the recipient. Typical email topics include account problems, account
verifications, security updates/upgrades, and new product or service offerings. Recipients of
email are prompted to react immediately and click on a link provided in the email body, which
actually directs them to the phishing Web page. The intent is to lure recipients into revealing
sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, account IDs, ATM PINs, or credit card
details. Like the phishing email, the phishing Web page almost always possesses the look and
feel of the legitimate site that it copies, often containing the same company logos, graphics,
writing style, fonts, layout, and other site elements. This spoofed Web page may also include a
graphical user interface (GUI) intended to lure the user into entering their bank account
information, credit card number, social security number, passwords, or other sensitive
information. Either the phisher, or an anonymous remote user that is sent the information, can
then use the stolen information. Phishing approaches used for identity thefts are constantly
growing and new variants are tried and used to attack business organizations, financial
institutions, and customers. Some of the most prevalent types of phishing and identity theft
attacks include deceptive phishing, malware based phishing, key loggers, screen loggers, session
hijacking, web Trojans, hosts file poisoning, system reconfiguration attacks, data theft, DNSbased phishing also called pharming, content injection phishing, man-in-the-middle phishing,
search engine phishing, spear phishing, vishing or voice phishing.
The phishing “ecosystem” consists of a collection of individuals who play various roles
within the phishing space, ranging from the financially-motivated botnet creators to those who
actively pursue and prosecute the cybercriminals. In this ecosystem, a large industry of buying
and selling - a “microeconomy” - exists within the phishing underground, involving botnet
creators, perpetrators, and enablers. However, these three player groups are complex and
intertwined: a single individual or multiple perpetrators can play separate or simultaneous roles.
Botnets, with an army of thousands of bots awaiting their instructions can use packet sniffers to
watch for sensitive information like usernames and passwords on the machine it has intruded and
accordingly send this to the botmaster (FCAC – 2006).
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Click Fraud
Some of the advertisements appearing on the websites are charged by the website
operators on the basis of pay per click revenue model wherein an advertiser is charged on the
basis of the number of clicks made by visitors on the advertisement appearing in a website. Any
mechanism that is used to increment this click counter in an automated or artificial manner is
click fraud. For illicit financial advantages botmaster can increment the click counter in an
artificial manner by commanding bots under its control to send web requests that represent clicks
on Internet advertisements. Botnet based click fraud is harder to detect because botnet comprises
of large number of geographically dispersed IP addresses and click through pattern matching
wherein geographical locations of IP addresses from each click are monitored fails. Click fraud
activity generates large volumes of revenue for attackers and their customers but at the same
time poses a great threat to both the advertisers and the content providers and thus is considered
as an emerging threat to e-commerce. Several examples of use of botnet in facilitating click fraud
have been reported wherein the content provider had to pay huge amount to settle the lawsuit
alleging the content providers of overcharging the advertiser. One such recent example has been
reported in July 2006 where Google agreed to pay US$ 90 million to settle such a lawsuit.
Another example involving the use of botnet to facilitate the click fraud can be found in
(McKewan – 2006).
Hosting illegal material and disseminating malicious code
Illegal material such as child pornographic (Olagunju et al – 2008) pictures, videos and
other such material, pirated software or code to crack the licensed software, pirated e-books,
pirated games, etc. can be stored as a dynamic repository on a bot compromised computer by the
botmaster. Often this illegal material contains malicious code in the form of malware like
viruses, Trojan horses, worms and others like spyware and adware. All bots contain functionality
that allows FTP, TFTP, and HTTP downloads and execution of binaries. This is the primary
method used by botnets to update their malicious code; however it is not limited to this alone but
can be used to download any file botmaster commands it to. This ability of bots to download and
install any binary is often used to install additional malware like Viruses, Trojan Horses, worms
and other malicious code like spyware and adware. A malware is an undesired code
surreptitiously introduced into a computer system to harm it. Spyware is software that is used to
collect personal information about users without their informed consent. Adware is software with
advertizing functions that are integrated into or bundled with a software package to recover the
costs of programming or reduce or even provide the software free of cost to users. However
adware may often take the form of spyware in which the users’ activity is tracked by the
software and sold without the consent or knowledge of the user.
Other Security Threats
Although botmasters need not to be highly technical yet some are skilled, organized and
are getting smarter day by day. Further, they have thousands of bot compromised computers at
their disposal and thus can launch variety attacks other than those detailed above. Online games
and polls can easily fall victim to botnets where bots can manipulate the results. Bots can be
levered to steal the online software license by transferring the same to some other computer. Key
loggers can be deployed with bots to retrieve sensitive and secret data. Bots can use packet
sniffing to watch for clear text data passing by compromised machines and retrieve sensitive data
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such as usernames and passwords. Botnets can setup a fake website with advertisements thus
leading to click fraud. Bots are used to download and execute harmful executive files via FTP or
HTTP and thus spread new malware and viruses. The growing access to Internet through mobile
phones can prompt hackers to attack cellular network system and create botnets on this system
which may cause inconvenience to millions of cell phone users.
BOTNET PREVENTION, DETECTION AND DISRUPTION
Botnets present significant new challenges for the Internet community as the attackers
come up with new and improved tools. Protection against falling victim to a botnet and detecting
the location of botmaster is very challenging owing to various facts that include i) the
mechanism used in constructing and maintenance of botnets and that used in its possible attack
are independent of each other, ii) Every Zombie in a botnet is a source of attack and iii) Botnets
remain in a silent state until they are leveraged to launch a specific attack (Strayer & et al –
2006).
Preventing a system on Internet from falling victim to a botnet requires a high level of
awareness about online security and privacy. Besides this, the system must be kept up to date by
installation of various Operating System updates and patches. Use of pirated software, games,
and other illegal material available online are always a source of malicious code and thus
presents a grave security threat and as such users should restrict themselves from accessing such
web sites. Further, software firewalls and antivirus/anti-spyware programs should be installed
and periodically updated on systems to prevent them from being infected. (Jones & Jim - 2003),
(Carpenter & et al – 2001). The use of CAPTCHA tests has been suggested for website and other
services for prevention against bots and other malicious agents.
Detecting the bot activity on a system or on a network is dominant to the study of botnets.
The use of honeypot has been the most popular method of setting a trap to detect botnet activity
(HoneyNet – 2005). Honeypot is generally an isolated and protected system that appears to be
part of a network and having valuable information stored on it. It allows itself to be infected by a
bot and become part of botnet. The honeypot is next used to capture the bot malware and detect
the bot controller. Various reactive and proactive techniques have been suggested to detect and
identify botnets. Detection of botnet by monitoring the network and host activity in terms of
number of users per channel service ports used or abnormal ratio of invisible to visible users, etc
have been suggested. In (Strayer & et al – 2006) examination of flow characteristics such as
bandwidth, duration and timing is suggested for detection of botnet C&C activity. (Cooke & et al
– 2005) suggests use of secondary bot behavior such as propagation and attack for detecting
botnets. In (Akiyama& et al – 2007) three metrics namely relationship, response and
synchronization have been proposed for detecting botnets through analyzing their behavior.
On detecting a botnet immediate mitigation goals are to neutralize the zombie by
removing the bot infection and more importantly to disrupt the C&C Server of the entire botnet.
Disrupting the botnet C&C server is significant because bot infected system is only part of very
large zombie army controlled by C&C Server and thus disrupting this controller will reutilize the
entire botnet.
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CONCLUSION
Increasing number of Internet users and its commercial character naturally bring in
proportionate number of criminal minded people to the scene who pose potential threats to
legitimate users, Internet infrastructure and timeliness of services offered by it. The aim of this
paper is to document Internet Security threats so that general understanding about the malicious
users and the malware is increased. The paper presents a detailed study of technology involved in
the design and control of botnets and threats posed by them. The main focus of this paper is
Botnet which enfolds all other attacks in one way or the other. The paper has not presented any
solution to the Internet Security threats but hopefully will generate an intense interest among
researchers to undertake research in this area.
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